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Abstract
The Levelling-Down Objection is a standard objection to monistic egalitarian theories
where equality is the only thing that has intrinsic value. Most egalitarians, however, are
value pluralists; they hold that, in addition to equality being intrinsically valuable, the
egalitarian currency in which we are equal or unequal is also intrinsically valuable. In
this paper, I argue that the Levelling-Down Objection still minimizes the weight that
the intrinsic badness of inequality could have in the overall intrinsic evaluation of
outcomes, given a certain way of measuring the badness of inequality, namely, the
Additive Individual-Complaints Measure.
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Introduction
The Levelling-Down Objection is a standard objection to monistic egalitarian
theories where equality is the only thing that has intrinsic value. For an illustration
of the objection, consider the following distributions:
P1 P2
A 2 1
B 1 1
In distribution A, person P1 is better off than person P2, whereas, in distribution B,
they are equally well off. Suppose that P2 is worse off than P1 in A through no fault
of their own. Then, clearly, B is more equal than A. But, since P1 is better off in A
than in B and everyone else is at least as well off in A as in B, it seems that A should
be overall intrinsically better than B. Hence equality can’t be the only thing that is
intrinsically valuable, because, if it were, B would be overall intrinsically better than
A (Parfit 1995: 26–28).
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Nevertheless, the Levelling-Down Objection doesn’t work against pluralistic
egalitarianism, where equality is not the only thing of intrinsic value. Larry S.
Temkin proclaims:1
I, for one, believe that inequality is bad. But do I really think that there is some
respect in which a world where only some are blind is worse than one where all
are? Yes. Does this mean I think it would be better if we blinded everybody?
No. Equality is not all that matters. (Temkin 1993: 282)
Likewise, Joseph Raz (2009: 32n7) argues that it’s implausible that there would be
any intrinsic value in an equal distribution of something intrinsically neither good
nor bad. Hence, to be plausible, egalitarianism must be pluralistic; because, in
addition to equality, the egalitarian currency in which we are equal or unequal
must also be of intrinsic value. And then the Levelling-Down Objection doesn’t
work any more, because the loss for P1 in B of the additional unit of well-being
might be intrinsically worse than the inequality in A. (We assume here that the
currency of egalitarian equality is well-being, but nothing crucial for our
discussion will depend on this assumption.)
In this paper, I shall argue that a version of the Levelling-Down Objection still
minimizes the weight that the intrinsic badness of inequality could have in the
overall evaluation of outcomes given an additive way of measuring the intrinsic
badness of inequality.
1. The Additive Individual-Complaints Measure
Temkin favours an additive measure that adds up all undeserved pairwise differ-
ences in well-being:
the ultimate intuition underlying egalitarianism is that it is bad : : : for some to be
worse off than others through no fault of their own. : : : . [T]he additive principle
reflects the view that if it really is bad for one person to be worse off than another
through no fault of his own, it should be even worse for two people to be in such a
position. Similarly, the relative to all those better off view of complaints reflects
the view that if it is bad to be worse off than one person through no fault of your
own, it should be even worse to be worse off than two. : : : . After all, to
paraphrase the basic insight of the utilitarians, more of the bad is worse than
less of the bad. (Temkin 1993: 200–201)
Here, Temkin suggests
The Additive Individual-Complaints Measure
The intrinsic badness of the inequality in distribution X equals the sum of the
absolute value of all well-being differences (not due to the fault of the worse off)
for all distinct pairs of individuals in the population.2
1See also Scanlon (1976: 9–10).
2I am following, more or less, the interpretation in Arrhenius (2013: 79).
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Temkin (2001: 346–348) also allows that inequality matters less at higher levels, but
this complication won’t matter for our discussion.
Given the Additive Individual-Complaints Measure, we have that the
intrinsic badness of the inequality in A is 1 unit of badness, since there is
only one distinct pair of individuals and the absolute difference between
their well-being levels is 1. And the intrinsic badness of the inequality in B
is 0 units of badness, since the members of the only distinct pair of
individuals have the same amount of well-being. To avoid the Levelling-
Down Objection, the loss of one unit of badness of the inequality in A
when we level down to B must count less for overall intrinsic value than
P1’s loss of one unit of well-being. Hence the Levelling-Down Objection
puts an upper limit to how much inequality can matter compared with
well-being in the balance of overall intrinsic value.
This might not seem very worrying for pluralistic egalitarianism. We can,
however, construct a more severely limiting version of the Levelling-Down
Objection which puts this upper limit at an arbitrarily low level. This
basically rules out that inequality has any influence on the overall intrinsic
value of an outcome, compared with losses and gains in personal well-
being. Consider the following distributions, where n (the size of the
population) can be arbitrarily large:
P1 P2 P3 P4    Pn
C 2 1 1 1    1
D 1 1 1 1    1
The Additive Individual-Complaints Measure entails that when n gets larger
the intrinsic badness of the inequality of C gets worse, with no upper bound on
how bad it could get. The intrinsic badness of the inequality of C will be equal
to n  1, since each additional person at well-being level 1 creates exactly one
new pair of people with a well-being difference between them: the pair of that
new person and P1. So we get that the inequality in C is arbitrarily bad given a
large enough n. The intrinsic badness of the inequality in D, however, remains
at 0 no matter how large n gets, since D never gets any people who differ in
well-being. So, given that n is large enough, we have that D is much better than
C with respect to inequality. On the other hand, there seems to be only one
respect in which C is better than D, namely, P1 has slightly higher well-being
in C than in D.
We can sum up the advantages of C and D relative to the other as follows:
Advantages of C over D:
P1 has one more unit of well-being in C than in D.
Advantages of D over C:
D has no inequality, whereas the inequality in C is intrinsically bad to an
arbitrarily great extent.
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To avoid the Levelling-Down Objection, we must still claim that C is overall
intrinsically better than D. And we must claim this regardless of how small the
unit of well-being is. Thus we get that any amount of badness of inequality
counts less than a minimal gain in the well-being of one person. The relevance
of the badness of inequality must therefore be negligible compared with the
relevance of the value of well-being for comparisons of overall intrinsic value.
Hence this limiting version of the Levelling-Down Objection shows that the
relative importance of inequality compared with well-being for overall intrinsic
value must be zero (or arbitrarily close to zero), given the Additive Individual-
Complaints Measure.
Note that this objection only applies to measures where the intrinsic badness
of the inequality in C grows without an upper bound as n gets larger.3 Measures
based on the average rather than total of the differences between individuals
avoid the problem.4 Likewise, the Gini-coefficient measure also avoids this
problem. The Gini coefficient can be calculated by multiplying the sum of all
pairwise well-being difference with 1=2n2µ, where n is the number of
individuals and µ is the average level of well-being.5 These more complicated
measures, however, give up the straightforward additive relationship between
the badness of undeserved individual differences in well-being and the
overall badness of inequality, which Temkin found compelling in the above
quotation.
2. Positive egalitarianism
Temkin proposes an objection of his own to the Additive Individual-Complaints
Measure. His objection concerns comparisons of inequality between distributions
for populations of different sizes. The Additive Individual-Complaints Measure
entails the following counter-intuitive conclusion:
The Repellant Conclusion
For any world F, let F ’s population be as large (though finite) as one likes, and
let the gaps between F ’s better- and worse-off be as extreme as one likes, there
will be some unequal world, G, whose population is “sufficiently” large such
that no matter how small G’s gaps between the better- and worse-off might
be G’s inequality will be worse than F ’s (even if everyone in G is better off
than everyone in F). (Temkin 1993: 218)
3Temkin (2012: 328–329) suggests a capped model for ideals, which would put an upper bound on howmuch
the badness of inequality can count against other ideals. This wouldn’t solve the problem, however, because a
capped model would still have to imply that the badness of inequality has almost no weight in large populations.
4See, for example, Rabinowicz (2003: 62).
5See Sen (1973: 31) and Donaldson and Weymark (1980: 70).
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The Repellant Conclusion can be visualized as follows:
Here, worlds F and G are each represented by two combined boxes, corresponding
to the better-off and worst-off halves of their populations. The width of the boxes
corresponds to the number of people, and the height of the boxes corresponds to
their well-being level. The dashed parts of the top of the two G-boxes reflect that
these boxes could be much wider. The Repellant Conclusion says, roughly, that, for
any world like F, there is a world like G which has worse inequality than F.
In response to variable populations cases of this kind, Gustaf Arrhenius (2013: 85)
proposes a positive form of egalitarianism where, in addition to pairwise relations of
inequality being intrinsically bad, pairwise relations of equality are intrinsically good.
This form of egalitarianism could avoid the Repellant Conclusion, since there are
many more pairwise relations of equality in G than in F; so, if the positive value
of these pairwise relations of equality were given sufficient weight compared with
the negative value of pairwise relations of inequality, G would be better than
F with respect to the combination of equality and inequality (Arrhenius 2013: 87).
Could this positive egalitarianism also save the additive approach from the limiting
version of the Levelling-Down Objection? It cannot. It makes the problem worse: In
addition to D having fewer pairwise relations of inequality than C, we also have that
D has more pairwise relations of equality than C. There are n  1 more pairwise
relations of inequality in C than in D. Accordingly, there are n  1 more pairwise
relations of equality in D than in C. So, in addition to D being arbitrarily better
with respect to inequality than C, it is also better with respect to equality, since D
has all the equality relations C has plus some further ones. Hence this positive
egalitarianism just introduces a further respect in which D is better than C. And
then, given an additive measure of the intrinsic goodness of equality, the Levelling-
Down Objection yields that the relative importance of equality for overall intrinsic
value compared with well-being must be zero (or arbitrarily close to zero).6
F G
6Note that this also holds given Arrhenius’s (2013: 89) proposal that only large differences in well-being
have negative value; small differences in well-being have positive value rather than negative, because they are
roughly equal and thus close to perfect equality. As long as relations of perfect equality are better than
relations of rough equality (which seems plausible), D will still be better than C with respect to the
combination of equality and inequality.
Economics and Philosophy 5
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000085
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 82.40.219.227, on 09 Jul 2020 at 10:25:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
Acknowledgements. I wish to thank Christopher Jay for valuable comments. Financial support from the
Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences is gratefully acknowledged.
References
Arrhenius G. 2013. Egalitarian concerns and population change. In Inequalitites in Health: Concepts,
Measures, and Ethics, eds. N. Eyal, S. Hurst, O.F. Norheim and D. Wikler, 74–92. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Donaldson D. and J.A. Weymark. 1980. A single-parameter generalization of the Gini indices of inequality.
Journal of Economic Theory 22(1), 67–86.
Parfit D. 1995. Equality or Priority? Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas.
Rabinowicz W. 2003. The size of inequality and its badness: some reflections around Temkin’s Inequality.
Theoria 69(1–2), 60–84.
Raz J. 2009. On the value of distributional equality. In Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice, eds.
S. de Wijze, M.H. Kramer and I. Carter, 22–33. London: Routledge.
Scanlon T. 1976. Nozick on rights, liberty, and property. Philosophy & Public Affairs 6(1), 3–25.
Sen A. 1973. On Economic Inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Temkin L.S. 1993. Inequality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Temkin L.S. 2001. Inequality: a complex, individualistic, and comparative notion. Noûs 35(s1), 327–353.
Temkin L.S. 2012. Rethinking the Good. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Johan E. Gustafsson is a lecturer at the University of Gothenburg, University of York, and Institute for
Futures Studies. He is currently at work on the book Money-Pump Arguments, which is forthcoming
with Cambridge University Press.
Cite this article: Gustafsson JE. The Levelling-Down Objection and the additive measure of the badness of
inequality. Economics & Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000085
6 Johan E. Gustafsson
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000085
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 82.40.219.227, on 09 Jul 2020 at 10:25:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
